Abstract-There have been some pioneering works concerning embedding cryptographic properties in Compressive Sampling (CS) but it turns out that the concise linear projection encoding process makes this approach ineffective. Here we introduce a bilevel protection (BLP) model for constructing secure compressive sampling scheme. Then we propose several techniques to establish secret key-related sparsifying basis and deploy them into our new CS model. It is demonstrated that the encoding process is simply a random linear projection, which is the same as the traditional model. However, decoding the measurements requires the knowledge of both the key-related sensing matrix and the key-related sparsifying basis.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Compressive Sampling for Security Purpose
Compressive Sampling (CS) has received much research attention since its first appearance [1] - [3] . By utilizing the fact that natural signals are either sparse or compressible 1 , CS theory demonstrates that such signals can be faithfully recovered from a small set of linear and nonadaptive measurement. This means sampling at a rate lower than that required by Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem is possible.
The extensive feasibility of the CS framework has stimulated its applications in various fields. For example, CSbased mechanism is widely employed to improve the quality of Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and to reduce the sampling time by the underlying sparsity property [5] . It is also found useful in image and video coding due to its nonadaptive random projection sampling process [6] , [7] . In addition, the extension of CS to practical data model, such as model-based CS [8] , [9] and the design of analog-to-information converter to extend CS to analog signals [10] are becoming more and more attracting.
The use of CS for security purpose was firstly outlined in one of the foundation papers of Compressive Sampling [4] , in which Candes and Tao suggested that the measurements obtained from random linear projections can be treated as ciphertext since the attacker would not be able to decode it unless he knows in which random subspace the coefficients are expressed. In this way, the entire CS scheme can be considered as a variant of the stream cipher. In [11] , Marco et al. employed CS for constructing image hashing algorithms to solve the authentication and tampering identification problems. In [12] , Wang et al. established CS-based framework under the secure multiparty computation protocol to address secure watermark detection and privacy-preserving multimedia storage problems. In [13] , CS was utilized to design the architecture of outsourced image recovery service for privacy-assured outsourcing problem in the context of cloud computing.
There were studies on the use of CS as a symmetric cipher and the corresponding security level. For example, it was shown in [14] that the measurement matrix provides a guarantee on the computational secrecy under some attack scenarios, such as brute-force attack and Ciphertext Only Attack (COA). Along this direction, there were many attempts in establishing a secure measurement matrix. In [15] , constructing the measurement matrix using physical layer security and linear feedback shift register (LFSR) with the corresponding m-sequence was proposed. In [16] , Yu et al. suggested constructing the measurement matrix using chaotic sequences. It was shown in [17] that structurally random matrix, whose performance is comparable to that of completely random measurement matrix, leads to a lower computational complexity and supports block-based processing.
In essential, the encryption performed by CS is linear which implies continuity. If an attacker happens to obtain two similar ciphertexts, he realizes that the corresponding plaintexts are also very close and he may launch a statistical attack from this point. This leads to an upper bound of the security of CS-based symmetric cipher thus the notion asymptotic spherical secrecy was introduced [18] , [19] . It states that the statistical properties of the random measurements tell nothing about the plaintext but their energies. In [18] , Cambareri et al. employed CS in a two-class lightweight information concealing system by artificially performing sign flips to a subset of the measurement matrix. Thus, first-class decoders can retrieve the signal faithfully but second-class decoders only get a downgraded version. Later, their work was extended to multi-class low-complexity encryption [19] .
B. Our Contribution
The above-mentioned CS-based symmetric ciphers retain computational secrecy only under some attack scenarios, i.e., brute-force attack and ciphertext only attack. In the remaining parts of this manuscript, we demonstrate that CS-based symmetric cipher as well as its enhanced version can be cryptanalysed under the Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) scenario. To develop a robust compressive sampling framework with enhanced resistance with respect to CPA, we introduce a Bi-level protection (BLP) model. Specifically, we propose several techniques to construct secret key-related sparsifying basis and deploy them into our BLP model. It turns out that the encoding process is the same as that of the original CS model. However, decoding requires knowledge of the keyrelated sensing matrix and key-related sparsifying basis. To demonstrate the feasibility of the modified CS framework, we apply the BLP model to digital images under the parallel CS reconstruction framework. The main features of this new CSbased image cipher, such as low computational complexity, robust to noise and packet loss, and its resistance to CPA, are thoroughly analyzed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we first review the framework of CS and present the cryptanalysis of the CS-based symmetric cipher and its enhanced version using CPA. In Sec. III, two techniques for constructing secret key-related sparsifying basis are proposed to establish the Bilevel protection model. In Sec. IV, the new model is used to sample digital images as an application example. The superiorities of the new CS-based image cipher are supported by both simulation results and theoretical analyses. The work is concluded in Sec. V.
II. EXISTING CS-BASED SYMMETRIC CIPHERS AND THEIR SECURITY DEFECTS
The signal to be sampled is denoted as a column vector x, i.e., x = (
T . It is said to be k-sparse under Ψ if there exists a certain sparsifying basis
such that x = Ψs with s 0 = #{supp s} = #{i :
,j=1 denote the measurement matrix and A = ΦΨ the sensing matrix, then the linear measurements can be obtained by
The intuitive way to restore x is to solve the optimization problem min s 0 subject to y = ΦΨs = As,
to obtain s and then recover x by x = Ψs. As stated in [20] , solving this problem essentially requires an exhaustive search over all subsets of columns of A, which is NP-hard. 
holds for all column indices sets T with #T < k, where
is a K × #T matrix composed of the columns indexed by T , x (T ) is a vector obtained by retaining only the entries indexed by T and · denotes the l 2 norm of a vector.
It has been proved that when the sensing matrix A satisfies RIP, the following convex relaxation problem min s 1 subject to y = ΦΨs = As,
has the same solution of Eq. (2) when k is not very large [20] . Finally, the original signal x can be recovered by solving Eq. (3) by basis pursuit or orthogonal matching pursuit method, and then compute x = Ψs. With the help of these notations, we can now categorize the existing secure compressive sampling schemes as follows.
A. Measurement Matrix as Secret Key
The widely-adopted measurement matrix follows the Gaussian distribution, which can be generated from a random number generator (RNG). Therefore, it is intuitive to use the seed of the RNG as the secret key to make CS a lightweight symmetric cipher during sampling.
It was reported in [14] that this CS-based encryption cannot achieve Shannon's perfect secrecy but it guarantees computational secrecy. Here we show that this cipher is also very weak upon CPA. Suppose that a series of artificial signals
are available. It is easy to find, from Eq. (1) , that
where φ j represents the j-th column of the measurement matrix Φ. Thus one can recover the equivalent secret key, Φ, by collecting all the ciphertext of {x j } M j=1 sequentially. Essentially, this scheme can be considered as the encryption using undetermined linear systems, which is proved to be insecure upon Known Plaintext Attack (KPA) in [22] .
It is worth mentioning that scrambling the signal before sampling cannot improve the security level. From Property 1, we know that the coefficients in the transform domain remain unchanged after scrambling. Use the same notation as in Property 1, we can express the modified sampling process as
Now, it is obvious that this modified scheme also subjects to CPA attack, like the original one. This is because one can recover the product of Φ and P using the same chosen plaintext set
. Then for any encrypted signal y ′ , the attacker can use ΦP as the equivalent key to determine s ′ by solving
and then recover the plain signal by x ′ = Ψs ′ .
Property 1. For any signal
T which is k-sparse in domain Ψ, its permuted versionx is also k-sparse.
Proof: Since x is k-sparse in Ψ, we have x = Ψs, where s 0 = k << M . Denote the permutation by matrix
with p i,j = 1 if the j-th element of x is moved to the i-th location ofx, and set all the other elements to 0. Now, we havex = Px = PΨs, which meansx is k-sparse under basis PΨ.
B. Scrambling the Frequency Coefficients
As stated in Sec. II-A, scrambling the original signal before sampling will not improve the security level of CSbased cipher. In [23] , Zhang et al. suggested scrambling the coefficients in certain sparsifying domain and then perform compressive sampling directly on the confused sparse coefficients. They implemented this scheme for processing digital images. This kind of scrambling possesses the advantage of relaxing the RIP criterion of the sensing matrix [24] , which usually results in a 2 ∼ 6 dB gain in the reconstruction quality [23, Sec.5] . In addition to computational secrecy, Zhang et al.'s method can achieve asymptotic spherical secrecy defined in [19] due to the normalization of the measurement matrix, while the scheme described in Sec. II-A cannot. The schematic diagram of their scheme is depicted in Fig. 1 .
From the cryptographic point of view, we can treat this approach as a concatenation of two individual ciphers: one scrambles the frequency coefficients while the other is based on undetermined linear systems. The secret keys of their scheme are the two seeds for generating the random scrambling sequence and the measurement matrix. Denote an image of size M × M by F and we can summarize Zhang's scheme as follows:
• Sparsifying Transformation: Sparsify the original signal by 2-dimensional Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT2) to obtain the frequency components S, i.e.,
where D is an orthogonal matrix and D T is the transpose of D.
• Scrambling Frequency Coefficients: Permute S randomly to make the principal coefficients distribute uniformly in
each column of S. Then denote the result asŜ.
• Compressive Sampling: MeasureŜ column by column with a key-related matrix Φ K×M which satisfies the RIP criterion with respect to the identity matrix, i.e.,
where y j andŝ j are the j-th columns of Y K×M and S M×M , respectively.
To recover the image F, one should first reconstruct the columns ofŜ sequentially by solving min ŝ j 1 subject to y j = Φŝ j , where j = 1, 2, · · · , M . Then scrambleŜ inversely to obtain S and finally recover F by F = D T SD.
Although frequency scrambling is a widely-used technique for multimedia protection [25] , [26] , we emphasise that it is still weak upon CPA even combined with CS-based cipher. To give a concise description of a CPA attack to Zhang et al.'s scheme, we make use of the Kronecker product of matrices and one of its properties.
Definition 2. The Kronecker product of two matrices
A = {a i,j } M,N i=1,j=1 and B = {b i,j } P,Q i=1,j=1 is A ⊗ B =    a 1,1 B · · · a 1,N B . . . . . . . . . a M,1 B · · · a M,N B    .
Definition 3. The vec(·) operator on matrix
where a j is the j-th column of A.
Property 2. For matrices
Proof: This is a standard property of the Kronecker product, the detailed proof can be found in [27, Chap. 4 ].
For image F and its DCT2 coefficients matrix S, referring to Property 2, we have
Since vec(Ŝ) is the permuted version of vec(S), we can relate them by a permutation matrix P M 2 ×M 2 as we did in Property 1, namely,
Then, rewrite the sampling process as
and refer to Property 2 again, we have
Finally, combining Eqs. (4), (5) and (6), we have
j=1 can be used to recoverΦPΨ. ThenΦP can be determined byΦP = ΦP(Ψ ·Ψ T ). Hence, for any intercepted ciphertext Y ′ , the attacker can reconstruct vec(S) ′ by solving
then restore the plain-image by
It is obvious form Eq. (7) thatΦ is constructed by putting Φ on its diagonal M times, which means the number of distinct columns inΦ is the same as that in Φ. We can further reduce the data complexity of CPA by utilizing this fact. If vec(Y) = (0, · · · , 0, y j , 0, · · · , 0)
T , we denote the kernel of vec(Y) by ker j (vec(Y)) = y j . Then we can recover the equivalent key using the following steps:
• Recover equivalent keyΦ: The chosen plain-images are in the form
Encrypt this kind of plain-images individually and collect the corresponding ciphertexts until M distinct kernels,
, of vec(Y) are obtained. The data complexity is O(M log M ) since this is indeed a Coupon Collector's Problem [28, Sec. 3.6] . Set Φ r = (ker 1 , ker 2 , · · · , ker M ), and it is clear that Φ r is the column permutated version of Φ.
• Recover equivalent key P: LetΦ r = I ⊗ Φ r and rewrite Eq. (8) as
whereP r is a permutation matrix with the location of the (M log M ) elements determined in the previous step.
If the signal's sparse level k ≥ (M 2 − M log M ), we can recover the rest unknown locations ofP r by solving the convex optimization problem
where vec(S 1 ) and vec(S 2 ) are two vectorized DCT2 coefficient matrix satisfying: 1) (M log M ) elements of them are exactly the same, whose locations are determined by the first (M log M ) rows ofP r . 2) any pair of the rest
can go back to the first step to recover n more locations ofP r to confirm k ≥ (M 2 − M log M − n) and then turn to Eq. (9) . The data complexity of this step is
Finally, the data complexity of the whole CPA process is
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
We reviewed several CS-based encryption schemes in the previous section and analysed their weakness upon CPA. Inspired by the fact that CS has an asymmetric structure, i.e., the sampling process is simply a linear projection of the signal to certain subspace but the reconstruction turns to solve an undetermined linear system by greedy algorithms, which is not linear. Meanwhile, from the discussions presented in Sec. II, we found that linear projections cannot resist CPA even combined with scrambling. Hence, we suggest designing key-related sparsifying transformation in this section. Then the security of the whole cipher is guaranteed by both the sampling and reconstruction processes. In Sec. III-A, we modify the basic CS model slightly to make it suitable for security purpose. Then we propose two schemes for key-related sparsifying transformation design, namely, Type I Secret Basis and Type II Secret Basis.
A. Bi-level Protection Model
As stated earlier, we need to slightly modify the CS model to make it match the key-related sparsifying basis, which will be described in the next section. The block diagram of this model is shown in Fig. 2 , where we suggest using key-dependent sensing matrix, A K , and secret-related sparsifying basis, Ψ K , to determine the measurement matrix
K . We are interested in studying whether the resultant measurement matrix Φ preserves the RIP property with respect to the sparsifying basis of x, especially the designated key-related one, Ψ K . To make it clear, we rewrite the sampling procedure as
Thus, to guarantee a stable and accurate reconstruction of the sparse coefficients s, one only needs to assure that the keyrelated sensing matrix A K satisfies RIP with respect to the identity matrix I. It is well-known that many matrices are competent for this task with an overwhelming probability, such as the Gaussian or Bernoulli matrix studied in [4] , the structurally random matrix suggested in [17] , etc. Moreover, we emphasize that the RIP property between the designated measurement matrix Φ and any other sparsifying basis is no longer fulfilled due to the scaling factors introduced in Property 3 and the linear combination trick descibed in Property 5 since they are not energy-preserving transformations. In summary, the encoding process can be described as
To reconstruct x, a legitimate user should first derive A K and Ψ K from the key schedule, then solve the convex relaxation problem
to obtain the sparse coefficients s and recover x by x = Ψ K s.
Since both the encoding and decoding processes are keyrelated, we call it a Bi-level protection model. The design of A K is trivial as it is already shown that those proposed in [4] , [17] suffice this requirement with overwhelming probability, we hereby consider developing key-related sparsifying basis in the following sections.
B. Type I Secret Basis
Employing Fractional Fourier Transform (FrFT) for security purpose can be dated back to the year of 2000, when Unnikrishnan et al. [29] suggested to use FrFT for doublerandom phase encoding instead of the Fourier transform [30] to benefit from its extra degrees of freedom which are provided by fractional orders. Generally speaking, perform FrFT with order α to a signal can be viewed as a rotation operation on the time-frequency or space-frequency distribution at an angle α. Though FrFT is very popular in optics for its easy implementation, it is not preferred in digital world since complex numbers always cause extra computational load.
To this end, Venturini et al. proposed a method to construct Reality-Preserving FrFT of arbitrary order [31] . Here, we deduce the Reality-Preserving Fractional Cosine Transform (RPFrCT) by the virtue of their method. Denote the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) [32] of size N × N by
where
where · * is the conjugate transpose operator, U = {u n } N n=1 is composed of N orthonormal eigenvectors, i.e., u * m u n = δ mn and Λ = diag(λ 1 , · · · , λ n , · · · , λ N ) with λ n = e jϕn . Replace λ n with its α-th power λ α n in Eq. (10), then we can express the Discrete Fractional Cosine Transform (DFrCT) matrix D α of order α in the compact form
Having defined D α , we can derive RPFrCT matrix R α as follows:
• For any real signal x = {x l } N l=1 of length N (N is even), construct a complex signal of length N/2 by
• Compute y = B α x, where B α is a DFrCT matrix with size (N/2 × N/2), namely, B α = D α,N/2 .
• Determine the RPFrCT matrix R α by y = (Re( y), Im( y))
From the construction process listed above, we can conclude that R α is orthogonal, reality preserving and periodic. Then, the Reality-Preserving Fractional Cosine Transform of a digital image F can be expressed as
where α and β are the orders of Fractional Cosine Transform along x and y directions, respectively.
Unlike those who employ fractional transforms for image encryption [29] , [33] - [35] , we aim at constructing a secret sparsifying basis. Thus the sparsifying capability of RPFrCT should also be taken into consideration. To study this, we carried out experiments at different fractional orders α and β by using the best s-term approximation, i.e., keep the s largest coefficients and set the remaining ones to zero. The recovered result of RPFrCT is compared with that of DCT2 using the ratio between their peak signal-to-noise ratios (PSNRs). As shown in Fig 3, the sparsifying capability of RPFrCT raises when α or β increases as we expected. When α, β ∈ (0.9, 1], the sparsifying capability of RPFrCT is comparable to that of DCT2. 
C. Type II Secret Basis
Let us consider the case that constructing secret sparsifying basis artificially, which aims at embedding secrets into the basis but keeps its sparsifying capability unchanged. We start this section by the definition of equivalent sparsifying basis. 
are distinct non-zero secret constants and ψ j is the j-th column of Ψ.
Proof:
Set s ′ j = 1 bj s j and we have s 0 = s ′ 0 .
Property 4. Ψ ′ and Ψ are equivalent sparsifying basis if
where P is a random permutation matrix.
Refer to Properties 3 and 4, we can employ operators F 1 (·) and F 2 (·) to design the secret sparsifying basis possessing the desired properties, i.e., keep the sparsifying capability unchanged 2 . In addition, if we know or partially know that supp(s) is localized in certain k-dimensional subspace rather than uniformly distributed in R N , we can embed more secrets into the sparsifying basis, which is stated in Property 5.
Here we assume Ψ as an orthonormal sparsifying basis for simplicity.
Property 5. Ψ ′ and Ψ are equivalent sparsifying basis if
where a, b are non-zero constants and j, k ∈ supp(s) or j, k / ∈ supp(s).
Proof: Since Ψ is orthonormal, s j = (ψ j , x) = ψ T j x and we know s j = 0 when j / ∈ supp(s). Then the proof for j, k / ∈ supp(s) is trivial. For j, k ∈ supp(s), set
Then we have (11), we conclude that s ′ 0 = s 0 , hence completes the proof.
Obviously, the operator F 3 (·) can be applied to three or more columns as long as all of the chosen columns are either in supp(s) or not. Finally, we provide an example to further illustrate Property 5. The grayscale image "Lena" with size 512 × 512, as shown in Fig 4a) , is transformed using RPFrCT with orders α = 0.99 and β = 0.95, respectively. Figure 4b) shows the absolute value of the RPFrCT coefficients matrix under the logarithm base. It is clear that the energy of the RPFrCT coefficients matrix is localized, specifically, they are concentrated at the left-upper corner of the four sub-blocks. Thus, we can apply Property 5 to the RPFrCT basis Ψ = (R β ⊗ R α )
T accordingly. a) 
IV. BLP FOR DIGITAL IMAGES AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we shall apply our BLP model and keyrelated sparsifying basis design for the secure sampling of digital images. Then we will make a deep investigation on the main properties of the proposed scheme, such as computational complexity, compressibility, robustness and security level.
A. BLP for Images
In our BLP model, the measurement matrix is determined by both the sensing matrix and the key-related sparsifying basis, thus we divide this section into two parts, i.e., designing the sparsifying basis and constructing the sensing matrix. Denote the image of size M × M by F and the secret key by (α, β, K 1 , K 2 ), where α, β ∈ (0.9, 1] are the fractional orders of RPFrCT, K 1 and K 2 are seeds of the RNG, then the operating procedures can be described as follows:
1) Designing Sparsifying Basis: We employ some techniques introduced in Secs. III-B and III-C to develop a key-related sparsifying basis. Generate and extend them to a permutation matrix P = (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p M 2 ) by setting
where p i is the i-th row of P. Generate M 2 real numbers between 0 and 1 from the last state of the RNG and denote the result by
and finally, the sparsifying basis is given by
2) Designing Sensing Matrix: To make use of the superiority of Parallel Compressive Sampling (PCS) reconstruction proposed in [24] , [36] , we employ a block-diagonal matrix [37] as the sensing matrix for our image cipher, namely,
where A j is a C j × M sub-Gaussian random matrix drawn from the RNG with initial state K 2 , j = 1 ∼ M and M j=1 C j denotes the total number of measurements.
As stated in [23] , [24] , random permutation P is an acceptable permutation, i.e., the principal elements of the coefficient matrix S under basis Ψ K will maintain the same column sparsity level with overwhelming probability. Thus, our image cipher based on the proposed BLP model can be implemented in a parallel way, as shown in Fig 5. Hence, the encryption process of the proposed compressive sampling scheme is nothing but a linear projection, i.e.,
K . The reconstruction can be carried out in a parallel way, i.e., min s j 1 subject to y j = A j s j , where y j , a column vector of size 1 × C j , is the j-th piece of vec(Y) and s j is the j-th piece of vec(S) which satisfies 
B. Computational Complexity
As parallel reconstruction technique is employed in the proposed image cipher, a comparison of the complexity between this scheme and the Kronecker Compressive Sampling (KCS) [38] is carried out in this section. The proposed image encryption scheme is composed of a linear projection, thus the sampling complexity is proportional to the image size, i.e., O(M 2 ). For KCS sampling scheme, which aims at sampling the images by a separable operator, the sampling complexity is only O(2M ). While turn to reconstruction, the decoder needs to solve the l 1 -optimization problem by basis pursuit or orthogonal matching pursuit, whose complexity is O(N 3 )
[39] in general, where N = M 2 in our 2D case. Thus, the reconstruction complexity of KCS, which aims to recover the sparse coefficients in a centralized manner, is O(M 6 ). For the parallel method, the reconstruction complexity for each column of the sparse coefficients is O(M 3 ), and thus the total complexity is only O(
. Hence, the total complexities of the proposed model and KCS are
can be concluded that our scheme possesses a lower overall complexity than KCS when the image size grows.
C. Compressibility and Robustness
Compressive Sampling acquires a signal according to its information intensity rather than its frequency, thus the required number of measurements is much less than that in spatial domain due to the fact that natural signals are intrinsic compressible. Denote the compression ratio (CR) by the ratio between the number of measurements and the number of elements in the coefficients matrix under the designated sparsifying basis Ψ K , we implement our image cipher at different CRs, the toolbox adopted for solving the l 1 optimization problem is CVX [40] . The image shown in Fig 4a) is encrypted under the secret key (α, β, K 1 , K 2 ) = (0.99, 0.95, 10, 20) at different CRs, and the corresponding results are depicted in Figs 6a)-c) . Then the parallel reconstruction technique is employed for decryption and the results can be found in Figs 7a)-c). From Figs 6 and 7, we found that even if CR is very small, i.e., the sampling rate is much lower than that required by Nyquist-Shannon sampling, we can still recover most of the visible information from the measurements.
As claimed in [24] , permute localized sparse signals can relax the RIP property of the measurement matrix. This is later verified in [23] that a gain of 2 ∼ 6 dB is achievable when this technique is applied to DCT2 coefficients of digital images. Since we employ permutation to construct equivalent sparsifying basis in our BLP model, this may also be applicable to the proposed model. To verify this, we carried out some experiments to compare the reconstruction performance of the proposed scheme which is based on BLP model and that of Block-based Compressive Sampling (BCS) model [41] in terms of PSNR. To make the comparison meaningful, the sparsifying basis for BCS is also RPFrCT with the same fractional orders. We repeat this test many times under different fractional orders and compute the average value. As observed from Table I , the scheme preserves the advantage that permutation relaxes the RIP property of the measurement matrix, and it can also be found that the overall performance of BLP-based scheme is better than that of BCS. Moreover, the smaller the CR is, the larger the gain is.
Unlike traditional schemes, the CS measurements are acquired in a non-adaptive way. Thus coding schemes based on this framework are robust with respect to imperfections, such as noise or packet loss during transmission. To quantitatively study this property, we evaluate the robustness of the proposed digital image sampling system with respect to additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and various packet loss rates (PLRs). For the former case, we artificially add a zero-mean normal distribution random sequence with variance 1 to the measurements while for the latter we randomly discard certain number of measurements governed by PLR. Then we attempt to reconstruct the original image from the corrupted measurements. In real applications, PLR can be up to 30% [42] and we measure the quality of the reconstruction in terms of PSNR at 10%, 20% and 30% PLR. These tests were carried out using the "Lena" image, but it is worth mentioning that one can get similar results using other images. As observed from Table II , our scheme is almost immune to AWGN when we compare the PSNR of the ideal BLP model and the one with AWGN. In addition, comparing the PSNRs at different levels of PLR, we found that the reduction rate of PSNR is linear to the increasing rate of PLR, which implies that all measurements are of the same importance. 
D. Security
We investigate the security of the proposed image cipher based on the BLP model. Intuitively, Shannon's perfect secrecy is not achievable but the secrecy of the measurement matrix can provide a guarantee of computational secrecy, which is the same as that stated in [14] . However, it is worth mentioning that asymptotic spherical secrecy [19] is no longer preserved in this scheme due to the scaling factors introduced in the operator F 1 (·). Here we evaluate the proposed scheme upon standard attacks, such as ciphertext-only attack, known plaintext attack and chosen plaintext attack, to investigate whether an eavesdropper with limited computational power can retrieve the secret key or its equivalence.
1) Resistance to COA: In the COA scenario, the attacker is assumed to have access to multiple ciphertexts, i.e., samples of digital images in our model, and is able to perform an exhaustive search over the whole key space to decrypt them. For traditional CS-based ciphers, such as those proposed in [14] , [19] , [23] , all the secrets retain in the seed for generating the measurement matrix Φ. To decrypt a sample vec(Y ′ ), the 
ends up with a k-sparse solution. He can then use this Φ ′ to decrypt all the other samples. It was shown in [14] that the above-mentioned method is computational infeasible. We point out that the proposed BLP model further complicates this setting since only when the attacker got the exact secret key A K and Ψ K can he stop testing.
2) Resistance to KPA and CPA: The attacker is more active in CPA than in KPA scenario, i.e., he is supposed to have the freedom to choose any plaintexts for encryption and obtains the corresponding ciphertexts. Thus, we focus on the resistance of the proposed image cipher to CPA. As demonstrated in Sec. II, an active attacker is able to recover the measurement matrix Φ = A K Ψ −1 K based on some chosen plaintexts. In the reconstruction, he has to retrieve A K and Ψ K from the inner product of them, which certainly have an infinite number of solutions.
However, an intelligent attacker may directly use the recovered measurement matrix Φ to sample another image In this way, he may avoid decomposition of the measurement matrix Φ and is able to recover the coefficients under another basis and then obtain the decrypted image. However, as stated in Property 6, no stable solution is guaranteed in this circumstance since the corresponding measurement matrix Φ does not satisfy the RIP criterion with overwhelming probability. Therefore, he can only turn to Eq. (2) instead, which is already known to be NP-hard. The attacker possesses full knowledge of the scheme except the key. He may try to guess the secret basis based on his own knowledge. Specifically, he constructs a basis Ψ ′ , when the solution of the problem
is k-sparse. Then he comes to realize that Ψ −1 K Ψ ′ = I and his guess is valid. This is equivalent to an artificially constructed basis mismatch problem [43] , [44] . Here we simply point out that it is impractical: leave out the impact of the scaling matrix B and the attacker happens to know the exact fractional orders (α, β), he still needs to exhaustively search (M 2 )! possible permutations, which is extremely hard for eavesdroppers with limited computational power. the maximum singular value and spectral norm of #T column sub-matrix of matrix C. Since A K is a sub-Gaussian random matrix drawn from a RNG using a certain secret key, it satisfies the RIP property with overwhelming probability, i.e., the relationship
holds with overwhelming probability. According to the definition of spectral norm, we have A K
Referring to the properties of matrix norm and making use of the fact that A K = ΦΨ K , we conclude A K
2 . Finally, we come to the conclusion that
hence completes the proof.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have reviewed several existing CS-based encryption approaches and found that they all subject to certain elaborately-designed chosen plaintext attacks. Thus, we modify the basic CS framework and suggest a Bi-level protection model to design more robust secure sampling schemes. In the proposed model, the sampling process is just a simple linear projection, which is the same as that of the basic CS model. However, decoding the samples requires the knowledge of both the key-related sensing matrix and the key-related sparsifying basis.
The capability of the proposed Bi-level protection model is exemplified by applying it to digital images. We have conducted a comprehensive study on the new image cipher and found that it is of lower computational complexity when comparing to the Kronecker Compressive Sampling scheme. In addition, it is robust to channel noise/packet loss and can resist known/chosen plaintext attacks.
